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ORIGINALISM’S PRETENSES 
Eric Berger∗ 
ABSTRACT 
When conservatives in the 1980s offered originalism as a constitutional methodology that could 
limit perceived judicial excesses, they touted its ability to constrain judges to follow the 
Constitution’s fixed, original meaning.  Though originalism has changed many times since, its 
proponents still generally preach these related virtues of fixation and constraint.  This symposium 
contribution reviews recent scholarly developments in originalism and contends that originalism’s 
capacity to fix constitutional meaning and constrain judicial decision making is overstated in 
both practice and theory.   
In practice, originalism’s many variants provide the ostensibly originalist justice great interpretive 
flexibility.  Originalist justices are methodologically inconsistent, offering an array of arguments 
rooted in original intentions, understandings, expected applications, and public meanings.  The 
justices also disagree on when originalism should guide outcomes, further adding to its 
malleability.   
In theory, the new originalism, which focuses on the text’s original public meaning, corrects some 
of these problems.  Nevertheless, it too often falls short of its promises to deliver fixation and con-
straint.  While fixation is possible in some instances, the history and semantic practices surround-
ing many disputed clauses are too muddled for the interpreter to identify a single, original public 
meaning.  Moreover, many constitutional provisions were framed and ratified during periods of 
profound intellectual flux, when key constitutional concepts and terms changed shape rapidly.  
Indeed, the very process of constitution making may have added further indeterminacy, as many 
members of the Founding and Reconstruction generations understood constitutional language not 
to provide precise legal guidance but rather open-ended political compromise.  As for constraint, 
many new originalists intelligently concede that their theory constrains only insofar as constitu-
tional construction must not violate the text’s original public meaning.  However, by requiring 
such fidelity to the constitutional text, the new originalists, far from cabining judicial discretion, 
invite justices to revisit settled constitutional precedent.  To be fair, other interpretive approaches 
similarly fail to constrain justices, but originalism’s pretense that it captures the Constitution’s 
singular, objective meaning creates an especially misleading illusion of certainty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When prominent conservatives like Judge Robert Bork and Edwin 
Meese offered originalism in the 1970s and 1980s as a method of 
constitutional interpretation that could limit the perceived excesses 
of the Warren and Burger Courts,1 they touted its ability to constrain 
judges to follow the Constitution’s fixed, original meaning.2  Though 
originalism has changed many times since then, its proponents gen-
erally preach these related virtues of “fixation” and “constraint.”3  In-
deed, even the “new originalism,” which focuses on the original pub-
lic meaning of the text, as opposed to the subjective intentions of the 
ratifiers or Framers, often emphasizes these merits.4  Because 
originalism fixes a constitutional provision’s meaning at the moment 
of its framing or ratification, new originalists argue, judges are con-
strained from supplanting the real Constitution with their own values.5 
 
 1 See Keith E. Whittington, On Pluralism Within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM:  THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 70, 72 (Grant Huscroft & 
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (arguing that when originalist arguments were developed in 
the 1970s and 1980s, they were “aimed at correcting what critics thought had gone wrong 
in American constitutional jurisprudence in the postwar period”). 
 2 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
159 (1990) (“The interpretation of the Constitution according to the original under-
standing . . . is the only method that can preserve the Constitution, the separation of 
powers, and the liberties of the people.”); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United 
States:  Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464 (1986) (arguing that 
judicial review is legitimate only when confined to a “jurisprudence of original intention” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 3 See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1343, 1372 (2009) (“The core of originalism is the proposition that text and history 
impose meaningful, binding constraints on interpretive discretion . . . .”); Lawrence B. 
Solum, What Is Originalism?  The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE 
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 1, at 12, 36 (“Most originalists agree that courts 
should view themselves as constrained by original meaning . . . .”). 
 4 See Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:  A 
DEBATE 1, 4 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011) (arguing that the fixa-
tion thesis and textual constraint thesis “are accepted by almost every originalist think-
er”). 
 5 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity:  Originalism and the Possibility of Constitution-
al Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 156 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION:  POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011) and JACK 
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)) (“The fixation thesis and the constraint principle 
constitute the core of contemporary originalist thought.”).  Of course, originalism is also 
concerned with other facets of constitutional interpretation beyond judges’ work.  See, 
e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 17, 279 (2011) (arguing that originalism should 
also involve interpretations by citizens, executive officials, and members of legislatures).  
However, because judges in our system ultimately resolve many of our most contentious 
constitutional disputes, this Article limits its discussion of originalism to judicial decision 
making. 
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Originalism has genuine virtue in turning our attention to history 
and text, and new originalist scholars have developed their theory in 
a rich and fascinating body of scholarship.6  Whatever its merits, 
though, originalism often cannot fulfill its promises of fixation and 
constraint.  Whether fixation and constraint are worthy goals is de-
batable, of course, but the point here is that originalism, both new 
and old, fails to attain either.  Indeed, the diversity of originalist the-
ories renders originalism very malleable.  To be fair, other interpre-
tive approaches similarly fail to constrain the Supreme Court’s consti-
tutional decision making, but originalism’s pretense that it is 
different creates an especially misleading illusion of certainty. 
This Article reviews recent developments in originalism scholar-
ship with particular attention to the new originalism and its ambitions 
of fixation and constraint.7  Part I briefly rehearses problems with 
originalism generally, as it is practiced, arguing that originalism’s 
malleability undermines its capacity to fix “correct” constitutional 
meaning and constrain judicial choices.  Because justices disagree 
about how and when to engage in originalist interpretation, we 
should be skeptical that originalism in practice limits judicial decision 
making any better than other approaches to constitutional decision 
making.  Part II turns to originalism in theory, focusing on the new 
originalism.  This Part contends that notwithstanding the new 
originalism’s great theoretical sophistication, it too will often fail to 
fix an objective constitutional meaning that meaningfully constrains 
judges in most litigation.  While fixation is possible in some instances, 
the history and semantic practices surrounding many disputed claus-
es are too muddled for the interpreter to identify an objective, origi-
nal public meaning.  Moreover, many constitutional provisions were 
framed and ratified during periods of profound intellectual flux, 
when key constitutional concepts and terms changed shape, thus 
making it difficult or impossible to locate a single semantic meaning.  
As for constraint, many new originalists intelligently concede that 
 
 6 I use the term “originalism” to refer generally and collectively to the various strains of the 
theory.  When discussing a single variant of originalism, I specify the particular strand at 
issue. 
 7 Due to obvious space limitations, this Article cannot address all relevant issues here and, 
instead, focuses on the problems of constraint and fixation.  There is a vast literature of-
fering broader critiques of originalism, both old, see, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived 
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985), and new, see, e.g., 
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Thomas B. Colby, 
The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. 
Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009). 
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their theory constrains only insofar as constitutional construction 
must not violate the Constitution’s original public meaning.  Howev-
er, by requiring such fidelity to the constitutional text, the new 
originalists, far from cabining judicial discretion, invite judges to re-
visit seemingly settled constitutional precedent.  The new 
originalism’s contributions to our scholarly discourse are considera-
ble, but, like the old originalism, its capacity to accurately fix consti-
tutional meaning and constrain judicial decision making is overstat-
ed. 
I.  ORIGINALISM’S MALLEABILITY 
A.  Originalism’s Variants 
Originalism, in practice, fails to fix an objectively correct constitu-
tional meaning that constrains judges in large part because there is 
disagreement about what originalist interpretation entails.8  These 
variations yield interesting discussions among legal academics, who 
can debate the relative merits of different approaches.  Judges, how-
ever, are typically less immersed in the academic literature and are 
often less theoretically self-conscious about which version of 
originalism they are applying.  As a result, ostensibly originalist judges 
approach the theory eclectically, drawing on useful historical or tex-
tual evidence to support a desired conclusion.  Such eclecticism, 
whether among or within theories of interpretation, is not necessarily 
bad.  Most judges approach constitutional interpretation with a range 
of interpretive approaches.9  But, theoretical eclecticism also gives 
judges leeway to find the approach that best supports a preferred 
outcome.10 
 
 8 See, e.g., Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 244 (“A review of originalist’ work reveals 
originalism to be not a single, coherent, unified theory of constitutional interpretation, 
but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that share little in common 
except a misleading reliance on a single label.”). 
 9 See, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (employing numerous 
kinds of constitutional arguments); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
747, 751 (1999) (enumerating the various constitutional arguments in M’Culloch); Brad-
ley P. Jacob, Back to Basics:  Constitutional Meaning and “Tradition,” 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
261, 262 (2007) (“Over more than two centuries of interpreting the United States Consti-
tution, the Supreme Court has developed a mass of tests, standards, interpretations, and 
levels of scrutiny . . . .”). 
 10 See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 79, 
79 (2010) (“Supreme Court Justices frequently divide on questions of original meaning, 
and the divisions have a way of mapping what we might suspect are the Justices’ leanings 
about the merits of cases irrespective of originalist considerations.”). 
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Within the family of originalist theories, judges can consult, 
among others, original intentions, original understandings, original 
expected application, and original public meaning.11  These variants, 
roughly speaking, share an interest in fixing constitutional meaning 
based on the relevant historical and/or linguistic evidence, but each 
variant asks a different question.  Though scholars are not entirely 
consistent when using these terms, generally speaking, original-
intentions originalism focuses on the intentions of the Constitution’s 
Framers (or the framers of subsequent amendments, where rele-
vant).12  Original-understanding originalism, by contrast, cognizant 
that the Constitution acquired legal legitimacy not in Philadelphia in 
1787, but through the ratifying conventions,13 looks to the under-
standings of the Constitution’s ratifiers.14  Original-expected-
applications originalism, a variant of the first two, asks how Framers 
or ratifiers would have expected constitutional provisions to be ap-
plied to particular issues.15  Public-meaning originalism differs more 
sharply from the first three, focusing not on the subjective views of 
the Framers or ratifiers,16 but rather on the objective semantic con-
tent of the Constitution’s text at the moment of ratification.17 
 
 11 This list of originalism’s variants is hardly exhaustive.  See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Living 
Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings of the American Constitution, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (2012) (listing varieties of originalism).  The list, in fact, contin-
ues to grow.  See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 5, at 3 (proposing a theory of “framework 
originalism, which views the Constitution as an initial framework for governance that sets 
politics in motion, and that Americans must fill out over time through constitutional con-
struction”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism:  A 
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 760 
(2009) (“[T]he Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the interpretive 
rules that were deemed applicable at the time.”). 
 12 See, e.g., Edwin Meese, III, Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association 
(July 9, 1985), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/page/the-great-debate-
attorney-general-ed-meese-iii-july-9-1985 (urging attention to the “original intention of 
those who framed” the Constitution). 
 13 See U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be suf-
ficient for the Establishment of this Constitution . . . .”); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS 54–55 (1998) (explaining that the delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention exceeded their mandate in drafting the Constitution and that Article 
VII requiring nine states’ ratification violated Article XIII of the Articles of Confedera-
tion, which required unanimity for any alteration to the Articles). 
 14 See Solum, supra note 5, at 12, 19. 
 15 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 296 (2007) 
(“Original expected application asks how people living at the time the text was adopted 
would have expected it would be applied using language in its ordinary sense (along with 
any legal terms of art).”). 
 16 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 100 (2004) (explaining originalism as a “commitment to a written text”); Law-
rence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 
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Of course, despite their differences, these inquiries can help in-
form each other and will sometimes point towards the same outcome.  
For example, evidence of the Framers’ intentions for a particular 
clause may help establish that the ratifiers understood the provision 
to mean the same thing, especially when particular Framers made 
their case to the people during the ratifying debates.18  Similarly, evi-
dence of the Framers’ intentions or the ratifiers’ understanding of a 
particular provision is a data point that can help discern the provi-
sion’s original public meaning; the Framers and ratifiers, after all, 
presumably often relied on public meanings when they used words.19 
That said, intentions, understandings, meanings, and expected 
applications are analytically distinct concepts, which can sometimes 
point towards different outcomes.  Though commentators and judges 
often fail to distinguish between the Framers’ intentions and the 
ratifiers’ understandings, the two can diverge.  For example, several 
Framers at the Constitutional Convention suggested that treaties be 
self-executing (i.e., that treaties would not require statutes imple-
menting them).  Many members of the state ratifying conventions 
apparently did not share that view.20  The original-intentions and orig-
inal-understandings originalist, then, may approach this problem dif-
ferently. 
Even when original intentions, understandings, and expected ap-
plications coincide, they can diverge from original public meanings.  
Justice Antonin Scalia and others have argued sometimes that both 
the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected the 
Equal Protection Clause to protect against racial discrimination but 
not sex discrimination.21  Contemporary Equal Protection Doctrine 
 
933 (2009) (explaining that the core idea of public-meaning originalism is that “the orig-
inal meaning of the Constitution is the original public meaning of the constitutional 
text”). 
 17 See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 23 (Univ. Ill. Coll. Of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Le-
gal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 2008) (arguing that the semantic content of 
a constitutional provision is fixed at the time of framing and ratification); infra Part II.A. 
 18 See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Mean-
ing of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 820–23 (2007) (arguing that some 
“Federalist Papers expressly purport to describe the original intent of the Framers” and 
that “[e]ven if the Federalist Papers did not influence the ratification debates, the ratifi-
cation debates may have influenced the Federalist Papers”). 
 19 See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
453, 464 (2013). 
 20 See Maggs, supra note 18, at 806 (arguing that evidence suggests that the Framers at the 
Constitutional Convention and the participants in the state ratifying conventions disa-
greed on whether treaties would be self-executing). 
 21 See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Justice Brennan:  Legacy of a Champion, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1151, 
1180–81 (2013) (“Justice Scalia  . . . has repeatedly stated that the Court’s gender discrim-
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clearly extends to sex discrimination, but it is certainly plausible that 
neither the framers nor the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
understood themselves to be protecting women from sex discrimina-
tion, which was widely accepted at the time.22  A semantic originalist, 
however, could conclude that the text’s original public meaning dif-
fered from the framers’ and ratifiers’ original expected application.  
The text of the Equal Protection Clause states that “[n]o State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.”23  Women are plainly “persons,” and therefore must 
be afforded “equal protection of the laws” under either contempo-
rary or 1868 linguistic conventions.  One could contend that “equal 
protection of the laws” is a term of art referring only to racial discrim-
ination, so that all persons—women and men—would be protected 
against race discrimination, but not sex discrimination.  The more 
persuasive reading, however, as Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert 
conclude, is that the Fourteenth Amendment “bans all systems of 
caste and of class-based lawmaking,”24 including, of course, sex dis-
crimination.  We, thus, have an instance where original expected ap-
plication likely yields an opposite outcome from original public 
meaning.25  Originalism’s variants, then, give the ostensibly originalist 
 
ination doctrine is wrong as an original matter because the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment clearly did not intend the Equal Protection Clause to protect women from 
discrimination.”); Terry Eastland, Op-Ed., Proper Interpretation of the Constitution, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1986, at A23 (arguing that “a jurisprudence of original intention” would 
not permit elevated scrutiny for sex-based classifications).  In fairness, Justice Scalia more 
recently said that “of course” the Fourteenth Amendment covers women.  See Jennifer 
Senior, In Conversation:  Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 6, 2013, http://nymag.com/news/
features/antonin-scalia-2013-10. 
 22 See Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction:  The Congressional Understanding, 94 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2000) (“The [Fourteenth] Amendment [during Reconstruction] 
was understood not to disturb the prevailing regime of state laws imposing very substan-
tial legal disabilities on women.”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitu-
tion from the People:  Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 31–32 (2003) 
(“[Sex discrimination law under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment] derived nei-
ther from the abstract text of the Equal Protection Clause nor from the original intent of 
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 24 Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
11 (2011). 
 25 One could also see the disparity here as a problem of levels of generality.  The reasonable 
observer in 1868 may have understood the Fourteenth Amendment, at a broad level of 
generality, to eliminate all systems of caste and simultaneously believed, at a narrower 
level of generality (admittedly paradoxically), that it said nothing about sex discrimina-
tion.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore this complication, but it is worth 
noting that originalism alone cannot find neutral principles with which to determine the 
level of generality.  See FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 41 (2013) 
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judge substantial leeway to justify a preferred outcome on originalist 
grounds.26 
Of course, were an originalist judge truly committed to employing 
originalism as a means of self-restraint, she could select a single vari-
ant and consistently apply only it.27  In practice, however, neither the 
Supreme Court, as an institution, nor individual Justices have sought 
such consistency.  While original-public-meaning originalism has 
emerged as the favored variant in the academy today,28 even the judg-
es most committed to originalism have arrived at no such methodo-
logical consensus.29  The result is that even when the Justices pursue 
an originalist inquiry, there remains disagreement, albeit sometimes 
unarticulated, about which version to apply. 
An oft-cited case pitting different variants of originalism against 
each other is District of Columbia v. Heller.30  The Second Amendment 
reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”31  The core question in Heller was whether that right to 
bear arms is limited to militia service or rather protects an individual 
right unconnected with militia service.32  The Court, in a 5-4 decision, 
held that the Second Amendment was not limited to militia service, 
but extended to other traditional lawful purposes, such as self-
defense within the home.33 
Scholars have hailed Heller as a “triumph of originalism” because 
both Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice John Paul Stevens’s 
dissent engaged in originalist reasoning (and, even Justice Stephen 
 
(arguing that in order to succeed, originalism requires a way to measure the proper level 
of generality). 
 26 See Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 292 (arguing that judges who invoke originalism have 
significant discretion in molding their approach to create results consistent with their 
own ideologies). 
 27 See infra Part II.A. 
 28 See Berman, supra note 7, at 4 (“[M]any self-described originalists have shifted their alle-
giance from original intent to original public meaning.”); Richard S. Kay, Original Inten-
tion and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 703–04 
(2009) (arguing that in originalist circles, the new originalists’ efforts to discover the “ob-
jective meaning” of the Constitution have carried the day recently). 
 29 See Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 293–305 (arguing that three ostensibly originalist 
judges—Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Judge Bork—all choose the version of 
originalism in a given case that allows them to reach their desired result). 
 30 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 31 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 32 Heller, 554 U.S. at 577. 
 33 Id. at 635. 
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Breyer’s dissent relied substantially on historical evidence).34  But, 
Heller also highlights originalism’s malleability.  Indeed, Heller calls at-
tention to the fact that different originalist inquiries can yield dra-
matically different results.  As Lawrence Solum has argued, Justices 
Scalia and Stevens approach originalism differently in Heller.35  
Whereas Justice Scalia’s majority opinion purports to be a study of 
the Second Amendment’s original public meaning, focusing on the 
text’s meaning at ratification,36 Justice Stevens’s dissent often focuses 
on the purposes animating the Second Amendment and the inten-
tions of its drafters.37  For example, as Professor Solum points out, 
Justice Stevens emphasized that “[t]he history of the adoption of the 
Amendment . . . describes an overriding concern about the potential 
threat to state sovereignty that a federal standing army would pose, 
and a desire to protect the States’ militias as the means by which to 
guard against that danger.”38  Justice Stevens, here, is examining the 
Framers’ and ratifiers’ intentions behind the Second Amendment.  
Justice Scalia, by comparison, closely examines the language of the 
Second Amendment and eighteenth-century usage, studying, for in-
stance, period dictionaries to contend that the Second Amendment 
term “keep and bear arms” did not solely connote use of weapons in 
the military context.39  While intentions and meaning sometimes co-
incide, the 5-4 originalist split in Heller makes some sense if we recog-
nize that the majority and dissent were simply engaged in different 
inquiries. 
It is also significant, however, that neither Justice Scalia’s nor Jus-
tice Stevens’s originalism is methodologically pure.  While Justice 
Scalia does devote a significant portion of his opinion to public-
meaning originalism, his choice of sources sometimes belies that ap-
 
 34 See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:  Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 191, 191 (2008) (citing scholars’ celebration of Heller’s use of originalism). 
 35 See Solum, supra note 16, at 957 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s opinion focused on the se-
mantic meaning of the operative clause while Justice Stevens’s opinion focused on the 
purpose or teleological meaning of the Second Amendment). 
 36 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that 
‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were 
used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’” (quoting 
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931))). 
 37 See Solum, supra note 16, at 957 (arguing that the disagreement between Justices Scalia 
and Stevens in Heller roughly “corresponds to the difference between original intentions 
originalism and original meaning originalism”). 
 38 Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting))(internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 39 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581–92 (citing, inter alia, Samuel Johnson’s dictionary and eight-
eenth-century statutes and state constitutions); see also Solum, supra note 16, at 955–56 
(discussing Justice Scalia’s Heller opinion). 
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proach.  For example, as Professor Saul Cornell argues, though Jus-
tice Scalia purports to examine the role of preambles in eighteenth-
century legal texts, most of his sources are from the nineteenth cen-
tury, which treated preambles differently.40  Justice Scalia also cites 
post-Civil War legislation and commentary.41  This evidence may be 
relevant to the incorporation question that the Court would later 
confront in McDonald v. City of Chicago,42 but it is, at best, tangential to 
the Second Amendment’s original meaning, unless one assumes (in-
correctly) that meanings cannot change over time.43  Whatever Justice 
Scalia’s motives for selecting this evidence,44 his apparent willingness 
to conflate eighteenth- and nineteenth-century legal conventions sug-
gests either an uncharacteristic attention to the evolution of constitu-
tional concepts or a surprising inattention to proper historical 
sources. 
Likewise, though portions of the dissent seem devoted to purpose, 
rather than meaning, Justice Stevens also includes some original-
public-meaning analysis.  For example, Justice Stevens examined sev-
eral state declarations of rights to contend that the operative clause, 
“keep and bear arms,” in eighteenth-century constitutional texts con-
noted “military uses of firearms.”45  It is true that Justice Stevens some-
times articulates his conclusions in terms of the Framers’ “focus,” ra-
ther than the language’s meaning.46  Such arguably unfortunate 
phrasing is part of the reason some scholars have characterized his 
dissent as concerned with purpose, rather than meaning.47  Neverthe-
less, this attention to the Framers’ “focus” should not hide the fact 
that, in comparing the language of similar eighteenth-century consti-
 
 40 See Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial:  The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 632–33 (2008). 
 41 Heller, 554 U.S. at 614–19. 
 42 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 43 See Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 613 (2008) (not-
ing changes in the First Amendment’s meaning during the early decades of its existence); 
cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 137–294 
(1998) (discussing how conceptions of certain rights changed during the Reconstruction 
period). 
 44 Cf. Cornell, supra note 40, at 63334 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s choice of sources in Hel-
ler was opportunistic). 
 45 Heller, 554 U.S. at 642–43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 46 See, e.g., id. at 643 (citing state declarations of rights to argue “that the Framers’ single-
minded focus in crafting the constitutional guarantee ‘to keep and bear Arms’ was on 
military uses of firearms”). 
 47 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 16, at 957. 
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tutional texts, Justice Stevens is also examining revolutionary-era lin-
guistic conventions, thereby examining original public meaning.48 
To this extent, Heller demonstrates that Justices can disagree both 
on originalist methodologies and on the proper interpretation within 
one methodology, thus raising questions about originalism’s capacity 
to identify the correct Constitution with which to constrain judges.  
Indeed, Heller’s 5-4 split suggests that originalism cannot deliver the 
lost ark of objectivity.  From this perspective, far from emerging tri-
umphant in Heller, originalism “struck out as an objective methodolo-
gy.”49 
Indeed, Heller offers but one example of this judicial inconsisten-
cy.  Justice Scalia has been the Court’s most vocal champion of origi-
nal-public-meaning originalism.50  Nevertheless, he hardly follows that 
interpretive methodology consistently himself.  For example, he has 
argued that the Eighth Amendment’s clause prohibiting “cruel and 
unusual punishment” binds future generations to society’s concep-
tions of cruelty in 1791,51 even though the word “unusual” seems to 
invite a comparative inquiry into contemporary punishment practic-
es.52  As Jack Balkin has pointed out, Justice Scalia’s argument here is 
rooted not in original public meaning, but in original expected ap-
plication, suggesting that even Justice Scalia, the new originalism’s 
most prominent judicial advocate, does not always heed the distinc-
tions between its numerous variants.53 
Justice Scalia has also authored or joined several opinions which 
hold states immune from suits by their own citizens,54 even though 
 
 48 See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 1 S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755)). 
 49 Daniel O. Conkle, Judicial Activism and Fourteenth Amendment Privacy Claims:  The Allure of 
Originalism and the Unappreciated Promise of Constrained Nonoriginalism, 14 NEXIS 31, 36 
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW:  AN ESSAY BY ANTONIN SCALIA 3, 37–38 (Amy Gutmann et 
al. eds., 1997) (arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted according to the orig-
inal meaning of the text). 
 51 See Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 50, at 129, 140; 
see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991) (Scalia, J., majority opinion) (not-
ing that in the Eighth Amendment context, “[t]he actions of the First Congress . . . are of 
course persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means”). 
 52 See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 259, 261 (2009) (“[T]he words ‘cruel and unusual’ invite a comparative inquiry.”). 
 53 See Balkin, supra note 15, at 296 (“Scalia’s version of ‘original meaning’ is not original 
meaning . . . but actually a more limited interpretive principle, what I call original expected 
application.”). 
 54 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that the suit was barred by the 
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 
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the text of the Eleventh Amendment limits such immunity to suits 
“commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”55  One might defend these votes on several grounds, such as 
the fact that the Eleventh Amendment does not explicitly deny states 
immunity in suits brought by their own citizens.  In light of this tex-
tual ambiguity, one could cite original history favoring a broader state 
sovereign immunity or defer to precedent protecting states against 
suits prosecuted by their own citizens.56  These are not crazy argu-
ments, but they are not new-originalist arguments.  To the contrary, 
given what John Manning calls the text’s “carefully drawn alignment 
of parties,”57 the better new-originalist reading is that state sovereign 
immunity (whether newly granted or pre-existing in Article III) only 
extends to those suits specifically identified by the Amendment’s 
text.58 
Of course, judicial inconsistency does not necessarily reflect a flaw 
in the theory itself.59  But, the fact that originalism is sufficiently open-
ended so as to encompass these (and other) approaches suggests that 
its ability to constrain is overstated.  Given the significant judicial and 
scholarly attention to originalism during the past few decades, its 
failure to limit judicial choices in practice should cause us to question 
whether it can, in fact, achieve such a thing.60 
B.  Originalism’s Implementation 
There is also substantial disagreement about how to implement 
originalism—that is, on when and how originalism should provide a 
 
261, 269 (1997) (same); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (same); 
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781–82 (1991) (holding that a conven-
tion did not surrender the state’s immunity). 
 55 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 56 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (“That a State cannot be sued by a citizen of 
another State, or of a foreign state . . . is clearly established by the decisions of this court 
in several recent cases.”); infra Part II.B. 
 57 John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 
YALE L.J. 1663, 1666 (2004). 
 58 See id. at 1723 (“A venerable maxim of construction holds that when a specific and a gen-
eral provision address the same subject, the specific governs the general.”). 
 59 See Lawrence B. Solum, Living with Originalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM, supra 
note 4, at 143, 163 (noting that objections to particular judges’ applications of 
originalism is not a sound objection to the theory itself); infra Part II.A. 
 60 See generally CROSS, supra note 25, at 73–151; JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1996) (noting that the terms 
“meaning,” “intention,” and “understanding” “are often used loosely and synonymously, 
at some cost to the clarity that [originalism] ostensibly seeks”). 
Nov. 2013] ORIGINALISM’S PRETENSES 341 
 
rule of decision.  For instance, originalist-minded Justices disagree 
about whether originalist analysis is appropriate in every case or just 
some cases.61  There is similar disagreement about whether 
originalism should be the sole guide to constitutional decision mak-
ing or one of many.  These disagreements have been explored by 
other scholars62 but are worth revisiting briefly to emphasize that even 
judges committed to originalism do not agree on how or when to ap-
ply it. 
Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas are the two current Justices 
most inclined towards originalism, but they approach the theory 
quite differently.  Their disagreement about the incorporation of the 
Second Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago63 well illustrates the 
difference.  Both Justices agreed with Justice Samuel Alito’s majority 
opinion that the Second Amendment right announced in Heller 
should be incorporated to apply against the states.  Justice Thomas, 
however, wrote a bold concurrence in which he rejected decades of 
doctrine analyzing incorporation through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.64  Instead, he contended, on originalist 
grounds, that “the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of Amer-
ican citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.”65  By contrast, Justice 
Scalia, who once professed to be a “faint-hearted originalist,”66 con-
curred separately, writing that “[d]espite my misgivings about Sub-
stantive Due Process as an original matter, I have acquiesced in the 
Court’s incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights be-
cause it is both long established and narrowly limited.”67  In other 
words, both Justices disapproved of incorporation through the Due 
Process Clause, but only one was willing actually to abandon that well-
settled doctrine.  Even originalists, then, disagree on when originalist 
 
 61 Cf. Berman, supra note 7, at 22 (“Originalism proper is strong originalism—the thesis that 
original meaning either is the only proper target of judicial constitutional interpretation 
or that it has at least lexical priority over any other candidate meanings the text might 
bear . . . .”). 
 62 See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity 
in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993); infra notes 81–87. 
 63 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 64 See id. at 3060 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he reason the Framers codified this right to 
bear arms in the Second Amendment . . . was the very reason citizens could not enforce it 
against States through the Fourteenth.”). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989).  Justice 
Scalia recently “repudiated” that self-description, saying that he tries to be a “stoutheart-
ed” originalist.  See Senior, supra note 21. 
 67 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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principles should decide a case.68  As Professor Michael C. Dorf puts 
it, “An inconsistent originalism that accommodates change some-
times but not always thereby sacrifices originalism’s claim to constrain 
judges and its claim to be the exclusive legitimate source of interpre-
tive guidance.”69 
Another variable is the clarity of the original meaning.  Many 
people would agree that where the constitutional text is very clear, it 
should presumptively provide a legally binding rule.70  Hence, there is 
virtually unanimous agreement that Article II, Section 1, clause 5 re-
quires that the President of the United States be at least thirty-five 
years old.71  No reasonable interpretive gloss can disrupt sufficiently 
that plain meaning so as to alter the Article II rule.72 
However, even the originalist Justices have failed to explain how 
the relative clarity of the original meaning should affect the Court’s 
willingness to rely on originalist analysis.  One could take the view 
that any reasonably clear and precise constitutional text should be 
treated as a binding rule.73  Neither the Court nor the originalist Jus-
tices, however, have adopted that approach.  For example, the 
Court’s free speech doctrine departs from the First Amendment’s 
plain text in two significant ways.  The First Amendment reads, “Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”74  Inter-
preted strictly, the Amendment forbids all congressional abridge-
 
 68 Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
723, 772 (1988) (“[I]f the Court legitimately may prevent inquiry into original under-
standing in order to maintain transformative change, does this concession also license 
prospective disregard of original understanding when the Court is satisfied that change is 
necessary to maintain systemic equilibrium?”). 
 69 Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2036 (2012) (reviewing 
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) and DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (2010)). 
 70 See Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 221 
(1988) (“[Some] interpreters . . . treat the text as the overriding source where it speaks 
clearly . . . .”).  But see infra notes 195–204 and accompanying text. 
 71 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“[N]either shall any Person be eligible to that Office [of 
the President] who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years . . . .”). 
 72 See Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”:  Abduced-Principle Originalism 
and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social Condi-
tions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 949 (2009) (arguing that this clause is “relatively determi-
nate”).  But see Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 78, 85–86 (noting that different cultures 
calculate age differently). 
 73 See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning:  Not as Radical as It Sounds, 
22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005) (“Where a determinate original meaning can be 
ascertained and is inconsistent with previous judicial decisions, these precedents should 
be reversed and the original meaning adopted in their place.”). 
 74 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
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ments of speech.  Of course, as most law students know, the Court’s 
free speech doctrine is not so absolute, permitting some speech re-
strictions.75  Moreover, despite the text’s clarity, the doctrine extends 
beyond “Congress” to the executive branch (and to the state govern-
ments through incorporation doctrine).76  The originalists on the 
Court have not attempted to reconcile apparently clear textual man-
dates with contrary precedent. 
Another puzzle for implementing originalism in practice is 
whether to “translate” original meaning to a contemporary world in 
which circumstances have dramatically changed.77  How should the 
faithful originalist apply the Founding generation’s views to a radical-
ly different world?78  One might imagine a range of possible ap-
proaches.79  At one extreme, a Justice might try to follow the original 
intended application of the relevant provision, trying to decide the 
case today as it would have been decided at the moment of the provi-
sion’s ratification.80  An alternative approach, as Lawrence Lessig sug-
gests, would adjust the literal text to preserve its meaning and pur-
pose in light of contextual changes.81 
For example, our Constitution’s balance between state and federal 
powers is deeply contested, but both sides generally agree that Article 
I granted some authority to the federal government and left authority 
over local affairs to state and local governments.  The Commerce 
Clause allocates some of this power, empowering the federal gov-
ernment to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.”82  A 
key question in our federalism is just how much authority the Com-
merce Clause confers upon Congress.  An originalist could explore 
this question in different ways.  One approach would be to limit Con-
gress’s commerce authority today to the precise powers it enjoyed 
when the Constitution was first ratified in 1788, a position Justice 
 
 75 See infra notes 72, 195, and accompanying text. 
 76 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925) (deciding whether a statute, as applied 
by state courts, violated the Due Process Clause). 
 77 See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 22 (2010) (“This basic problem—what 
do you do when circumstances change?—can occur whenever someone has an obligation 
to follow instructions given by another person and cannot communicate with the person 
who gave the instructions.”); Lessig, supra note 62, at 1201  (“In trying to find equivalents 
between two relatively autonomous systems of meaning, the translator—despite her tradi-
tional mechanic guise—must judge how the gaps will be filled.”). 
 78 See David E. Strauss, The Death of Judicial Conservatism, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 
3 (2009) (discussing the ways that Justices can interpret the Constitution). 
 79 See generally Lessig, supra note 62. 
 80 See id. at 1171 (explaining what strict originalist interpretation entails). 
 81 Id. at 1174–82. 
 82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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Thomas has suggested.83  A different approach would be to recognize 
that the scope of the national economy and interstate commerce has 
increased dramatically since the eighteenth century and to hold that 
the scope of Congress’s commerce authority necessarily expands in 
proportion to those changes.84  In other words, as the markets operat-
ing on a national scale grew, so too should the “predicate for federal 
power.”85 
Both the “original-intended application” and the translated “orig-
inal-proportion-to-the-national-economy” approach can fairly claim to 
be originalist, but the Justices have offered no approach for deter-
mining which originalism is more legitimate.  Indeed, despite over 
three decades of great judicial and scholarly attention to originalism, 
the Justices’ originalism is badly under-theorized, barely acknowledg-
ing these kinds of questions, let alone wrestling with them honestly 
and systematically.86  Given the Court’s inattention to these basic 
methodological questions, it is hard to take seriously the contention 
that originalism in practice fixes the “correct” Constitution and con-
strains judicial decision making.87 
II.  THE NEW ORIGINALISM’S SHORTCOMINGS 
A.  The New Originalism Described 
Just because originalism in practice fails to fix an objective consti-
tutional meaning or constrain judicial decision making does not 
mean that it could not do so were a single variant more faithfully ap-
plied.  The problems just rehearsed arise from the fact that the Jus-
tices do not consistently apply the same version of originalism.  These 
are problems with originalism in practice, not originalism in theory. 
 
 83 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (“[T]he very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test under the Commerce Clause is 
inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s 
early Commerce Clause cases.” (quoting  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 
(2000) (Thomas, J., concurring))). 
 84 See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:  United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 
125, 137–54. 
 85 Id. at 140. 
 86 See Michael C. Dorf, Tainted Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 923, 937–38 (2012) (“[D]espite the 
shift in academic defenses of originalism, judges and others continue to invoke the older, 
more simple-minded expected-applications version of originalism.”). 
 87 See CROSS, supra note 25, at 190 (concluding that Justices’ invocation of originalism “is 
very selective and not particularly constraining on the decisions or opinions of the justic-
es”); Strauss, supra note 78, at 3 (arguing that one problem with originalism is “that it is 
not doable” in practice). 
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The obvious solution to these inconsistencies would be to select a 
single version of originalism and always stick to it.  The best candidate 
for this proposal is the new originalism, because it is the most widely 
accepted today among originalists and the most theoretically sophis-
ticated.88  While I share John Harrison’s skepticism that judges will 
confine themselves to a single interpretive approach,89 especially giv-
en that their fellow jurists would not be similarly constrained, it is also 
worth examining the theory on its own terms.  Indeed, the new 
originalist, I imagine, would largely agree with much of what I have 
said so far.  The problem, he would contend, is that Supreme Court 
Justices have not been faithful, methodologically consistent 
originalists.90  Consistent adherence to new originalism would accom-
plish the goals of fixation and constraint—and more. 
Scholars, like Randy Barnett, Lawrence Solum, and Keith Whit-
tington, have developed the new originalism in a rigorous, intelligent 
literature.91  Because these new originalists focus on the objective 
plain meaning of the document, they ostensibly need not worry about 
weighing the Framers’ or ratifiers’ subjective views against each oth-
er.92  Instead, they focus on linguistic facts contemporaneous to ratifi-
cation to discern the language’s semantic meaning.  As Whittington 
puts it, the new originalism “urges interpreters to look to the text and 
what a competent reader of the text at the time would have under-
 
 88 See Colby, supra note 7, at 724 (arguing that an inquiry into how a reasonable person 
would have understood the words in the Constitution in 1788 is a more refined and so-
phisticated form of originalism than original intent or original understanding). 
 89 See John Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 473, 473–74 (2008) (expressing skepticism about originalism’s capacity to 
constrain judicial activism). 
 90 See, e.g., ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS:  WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND 
ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES 126 (2012) (“Justices Thomas and Scalia have often advo-
cated originalism as their preferred method of constitutional interpretation but neither 
Justice has any use for that doctrine when it leads to a result they don’t favor such as ap-
proving affirmative action programs.”); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity:  A Critique of 
“Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13 (2006) (“Justice Scalia is simply not an 
originalist.”);  Lee J. Strang, The Most Faithful Originalist?:  Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and 
the Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 882 (2011) (arguing that Justice 
Thomas is a less faithful originalist than the conventional wisdom suggests). 
 91 Despite much common ground, there are also important variations among the new 
originalists, see infra note 190, but it is beyond the scope of this Article to rehearse all the-
se distinctions. 
 92 See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1162 (2003) (“As a matter of constitutional interpreta-
tion, it matters not what any (much less all) of the Ratifiers actually intended or understood, 
but what the hypothetical reasonably well-informed Ratifier would have objectively under-
stood the legal text to mean with all of the relevant information in hand.”). 
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stood it to mean.”93  The result, the new originalists argue, is a more 
objective and theoretically legitimate originalism.94 
The new originalism, also known as “semantic originalism” or 
“original public meaning originalism,”95 contends “that constitutional 
law includes rules with content that are fixed by the original public 
meaning of the text—the conventional semantic meaning of the 
words and phrases in context.”96  As Professor Solum explains, new 
originalists implement this theory in a two-step process consisting, 
first, of constitutional interpretation and, second, of constitutional con-
struction.97  The first step for the semantic originalist is to interpret the 
Constitution by studying how contemporaneous sources of conven-
tional meaning, such as newspapers, diaries, dictionaries, speeches, 
pamphlets, and legal documents, used particular words and phrases.98  
(In this sense, the search for the original semantic meaning can uti-
lize some of the same sources used to discern the Framers’ intentions 
and ratifiers’ understandings.)  From this evidence, the new 
originalist gleans the original public meaning of the relevant provi-
sion.99  In some cases, this semantic meaning in context will provide 
the rule of decision, thereby constraining the interpreter to follow 
that rule.  However, constitutional provisions are often too abstract to 
provide decisive guidance, and, in those cases when the text “runs 
out,”100 the next step requires the judge to construct constitutional 
meaning—that is, to supply content to the legal language to decide 
the case.101  During this constitutional construction, judges “must be 
guided by something other than the semantic content of the constitu-
 
 93 Whittington, supra note 1, at 70, 71–72. 
 94 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 648 (1999) 
(asserting that the new originalism avoids the objections that have been raised against 
subjective originalism and provides a structural framework of interpretation). 
 95 I use these three terms interchangeably. 
 96 Solum, supra note 17, at 2. 
 97 Id. at 67–69. 
 98 See Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause:  Why the 
Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 915 (2013) (discerning original 
public meaning by looking at “dictionaries, speeches, newspaper articles, documents, leg-
islative histories, and historical events”). 
 99 Solum, supra note 17, at 67. 
100 Id. at 69. 
101 See Barnett, supra note 73, at 264 (“The process of applying general abstract provisions to 
the facts of particular cases by adopting intermediate doctrines is properly called, not in-
terpretation, but constitutional construction.”); see also Solum, supra note 17, at 68–69 
(explaining that the practice of supplying content beyond semantic meaning is “constitu-
tional construction”). 
Nov. 2013] ORIGINALISM’S PRETENSES 347 
 
tional text”102 so long as they do not violate the boundaries estab-
lished by the original semantic meaning.103 
The new originalism intelligently corrects some of originalism’s 
earlier variants’ flaws and candidly acknowledges that original public 
meaning cannot resolve all cases by itself.  Indeed, at the construction 
step, some new originalists abandon the claim that the theory con-
strains judicial decision making.104  However, the new originalism still 
does contend that the original semantic meaning sets the boundaries 
of constitutional meaning, and many new originalists, following the 
lead of “old” originalists, insist that the theory does constrain judicial 
decision making by requiring judges to follow an objective, ascertain-
able constitutional meaning.105  This theory helpfully reminds judges 
and scholars not to forget constitutional text and history, but, to the 
extent that it purports to fix an objective constitutional meaning and 
thereby cabin judicial discretion, it cannot deliver what it promises. 
B.  Fixation Problems 
The new originalism’s effort to fix the correct constitutional 
meaning assumes that it can accurately discern an objective original 
constitutional meaning.  This may sometimes be possible.  However, 
for many provisions most likely to arise in litigation, the notion of a 
“right answer” is a legal fiction that fails to appreciate both the practi-
cal difficulties of historical inquiry and the relevant history itself.  As 
Mark Tushnet puts it, “[t]he new originalism seeks the original public 
meaning of constitutional terms, but there is (was) no single such 
meaning . . . at least for interesting constitutional terms.”106 
First, just like older iterations of originalism, semantic originalism 
fails to appreciate fully the complexity and contradictions often in-
herent in the relevant historical evidence.107  The new originalism 
purports to correct this evidentiary problem because, unlike searches 
for the Framers’ or ratifiers’ subjective intentions, semantic 
originalism does not involve the difficulty of ostensibly uncovering a 
 
102 Solum, supra note 17, at 19; see also Whittington, supra note 1, at 82; discussion infra Part 
II. 
103 See Barnett, supra note 73, at 263–64. 
104 See infra notes 181–86 and accompanying text. 
105 See Solum, supra note 17, at 2 (“Almost all originalists agree, explicitly or implicitly, that 
the meaning (or ‘semantic content’) of a given Constitutional provision was fixed at the 
time the provision was framed and ratified.”); infra note 187 (citing arguments that new 
originalism will constrain judicial decision making). 
106 Tushnet, supra note 43, at 617. 
107 See, e.g., Charles Fried, On Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025, 1034 (2011) (refer-
ring to Clio as “an uncertain, almost whimsical guide”). 
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collective body’s single intention.108  Instead, new originalists, like 
Professor Solum, drawing on the linguistic work of Paul Grice and 
others, seek to find the relevant constitutional provision’s “sentence 
meaning” by identifying objective “meanings that are conventional 
given relevant linguistic practices” at the time of ratification.109  Those 
meanings are “facts determined by the evidence.”110 
Fixation is an understandable impulse, especially given that our 
Constitution, unlike the English one, is written.111  However, we can-
not always (or even often) accurately discern how “a reasonable 
speaker of English”112 would have understood a constitutional provi-
sion.  To be sure, we sometimes can.  As already discussed, Article II, 
read in accordance with eighteenth- (or twenty-first-) century linguis-
tic conventions, requires that the President be at least thirty-five.113  
But, many constitutional provisions, like the Second Amendment,114 
are contested in part because the evidence surrounding their original 
meaning is complicated and contradictory.  The disagreement be-
tween Justices Scalia and Stevens was not solely methodological.  It 
was also based on different interpretations of the kinds of evidence 
that ostensibly give rise to semantic meaning, such as the way eight-
eenth-century texts used prefatory clauses and the phrase “keep and 
bear arms.”115 
The problem for the new originalism’s fixation claims is that pro-
visions like the Second Amendment are far more likely to be the sub-
ject of dispute and litigation than provisions like Article II, Section 1, 
clause 5.  Contrary to the conflicting opinions’ self-assured tones in 
Heller, it is far from clear who was correct.116  Indeed, the mere fact of 
 
108 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 17, at 42–50 (emphasizing the superiority of constitutional in-
terpretation based on the original semantic meaning of the words, as opposed to the col-
lective intent of the Framers). 
109 Id. at 35. 
110 Id. at 36. 
111 See BARNETT, supra note 16, at 100–09 (emphasizing that the Constitution’s “writtenness” 
“locks in” meaning). 
112 Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 105 
(2001). 
113 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text; infra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
114 See supra notes 30–49 and accompanying text. 
115 See supra notes 40–49.  Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) 
(“The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason 
Americans valued the ancient right . . . .”), with id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The 
preamble thus both sets forth the object of the Amendment and informs the meaning of 
the remainder of its text.”). 
116 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 
253, 266 (2009) (“If there is a reasonable case for the majority’s interpretation of the Se-
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the 5-4 split on originalist grounds—and the accompanying scholarly 
disagreement117—suggests that the “correct” answer here will be deep-
ly contested. 
Other provisions are likewise contested.  For example, excellent 
scholars not only disagree on the original meaning of the Commerce 
Clause, but also defend interpretations that would yield opposite out-
comes in most contemporary cases.118  Similarly, scholars disagree 
about whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Bolling v. Sharpe119 can 
be justified on original-public-meaning grounds.  Bolling, decided the 
same day as Brown v. Board of Education,120 invalidated federal racial 
public school segregation in the District of Columbia, notwithstand-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, which stipulates that “No State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.”121  Some scholars have offered creative defenses of 
Bolling on new originalist grounds by contending that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Citizenship Clause foreclosed the federal government 
from denying United States citizens the rights inherent in federal cit-
izenship, including equal protection of the laws.122  Others have in-
sisted instead that the Equal Protection Clause means what it says and 
only applies to state governments.123  While most commentators ap-
 
cond Amendment, there is also a reasonable case for the position taken by the dissent-
ers.”). 
117 Compare Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History:  “Meet the New Boss, 
Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1111 (2009) (criticizing the new originalism 
and Heller’s “backwards approach to history”), with Randy E. Barnett, News Flash:  The Con-
stitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (defending Heller as the 
“finest example of . . . ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Su-
preme Court”). 
118 Compare Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49 (2010) (“The original meaning 
of the Commerce Clause is consistent with the modern activist state and gives the federal 
government wide latitude to pass civil rights, employment, consumer protection, health, 
and environmental laws.”), with Barnett, supra note 112, at 146 (“The most persuasive ev-
idence of original meaning . . . strongly supports Justice Thomas’s . . . narrow interpreta-
tion of Congress’s [Commerce] power . . . .”). 
119 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
120 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
121 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
122 See Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493, 598 
(2013) (“[T]here is a strong basis for concluding that whatever equality rights citizens 
possess against state governments by virtue of their status as ‘persons’ protected by the 
Equal Protection Clause are equally enforceable against the federal government by virtue 
of their status as ‘citizens’ under the Citizenship Clause.”). 
123 See BORK, supra note 2, at 83 (criticizing Bolling as a “clear rewriting of the Constitution by 
the Warren Court”); Brest, supra note 7, at 232–33 (“[A] moderate originalist cannot easi-
ly justify the incorporation of principles of equal treatment into the due process clause of 
the fifth amendment . . . .”). 
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plaud the result in Bolling, they disagree about whether it is consistent 
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s original public meaning.124 
While compelling arguments sometimes can be made in favor of 
one reading over another, the process of selection almost necessarily 
involves historical judgments that judges lack both the time and train-
ing to make,125 especially in light of the surrounding historical con-
text, which cannot be quickly gleaned during the few months in 
which a judge considers a case.126  Because of these problems, judges 
are likely to take shortcuts in evaluating the evidence127 and to fall 
back on preconceptions about history and language, as well as nor-
mative predilections.128  While it is perfectly natural for judges to be 
influenced by norms in close cases, it is misleading to say that the re-
sulting decision then rests on the “correct” reading of the original 
semantic meaning.129 
To be fair, some new originalists, like Professor Solum, are careful 
to emphasize the “modesty” of the claim and the fact that, sometimes, 
we cannot know what the relevant linguistic facts are.130  For example, 
Solum acknowledges that evidence is sometimes not accessible to dis-
cern the text’s original public meaning.131  The dearth of evidence is a 
problem, no doubt, but so is too much contradictory evidence.132  Of 
 
124 It is worth noting that a theory that eviscerated Bolling would be, for good reason, morally 
objectionable to many and therefore extremely difficult to sell. 
125 Cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The battle of the 
string citations can have no winner.”); infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
126 See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public 
Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 580 (2011) (denigrating “law-office histo-
ry” searching for historical citations to bolster legal arguments). 
127 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, and the Democratic Dilemma:  Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1485, 1495 (2012) (arguing that judicial analysis of history is “susceptible to manipula-
tion”); Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1232–42 (2012) (de-
tailing how several ostensibly originalist Supreme Court opinions are not). 
128 See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 267 (2d ed. 1995) (“A person 
who is trying to understand a text is always projecting.”); infra Conclusion. 
129 See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1334 
(2008) (claiming that when judges are not adept at evaluating judicial evidence, 
originalism may produce biased decisions); Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1045–46 (2002) (describing the dangers that may occur when a judge 
is biased in selecting and using interpretive approaches). 
130 Solum, supra note 17, at 37. 
131 Id. 
132 See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 
930 (1998) (“Because the historical evidence is often inadequate and contradictory, the 
historical record rarely yields any clear answers to the most important questions of consti-
tutional interpretation.”); Steven G. Gey, More or Less Bunk:  The Establishment Clause An-
swers That History Doesn’t Provide, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1617, 1630 (“With regard to our de-
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course, there will be instances when the vast majority of the evidence 
stacks up comfortably on one side of the ledger, and we can be rea-
sonably confident that the hypothetical, well-informed observer in 
1788 would have understood a certain clause in a particular manner.  
But, as Heller demonstrates, there are also important instances where 
the evidence is so complicated that judges divide (roughly) evenly on 
the proper interpretation.133  Read modestly, of course, semantic 
originalism could concede this point,134 but if it does, it will leave us 
with a theory that does most of its work in the cases about which we 
mostly agree anyway.135 
A second and related problem with the new originalism’s efforts 
to fix objective original meaning is that the inquiry undervalues the 
intellectual flux that characterized many key constitutional periods.136  
For example, constitutional concepts and terms changed shape fre-
quently during the Founding era.137  Attempts to “fix” a single mean-
ing to particular terms or provisions miss the age’s intellectual fer-
ment.  Key constitutional concepts—like sovereignty, bicameralism, 
federalism, individual rights, and executive power—were vigorously 
debated and constantly changing during the closing decades of the 
eighteenth century.138  The fixation thesis ascribes to the constitution-
al terms addressing these and other concepts a singular meaning that 
cannot capture the complexity and multiplicity of meanings that the 
terms then enjoyed. 
Indeed, prominent historians of the American Revolution have 
spent much of their careers exploring these intellectual transfor-
 
termination of what the Constitution means today, the contradictory historical evidence is 
simply not dispositive.”). 
133 Cf. EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 10 (1961) (“The belief in a hard core of 
historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the histori-
an is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate.”). 
134 See infra notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
135 See infra Part II.C. 
136 It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer detailed historical analysis.  For excellent 
studies examining the difficulty of identifying original meanings during the Founding 
and Reconstruction periods, respectively, see generally RAKOVE, supra note 60; WILLIAM E. 
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:  FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL 
DOCTRINE (1988). 
137 See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 40, at 631 (noting originalists’ inattention to how meanings 
changed over time); Rakove, supra note 126, at 577–78 (arguing that the meanings of 
constitutional terms change over time). 
138 See generally RAKOVE, supra note 60 at 3–22 (discussing the perils of originalism); GORDON 
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC:  1776–1787 (1969) (detailing a se-
ries of intellectual changes in the political culture and belief systems in revolutionary 
America). 
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mations.139  To give just one example, Americans’ ideas about the 
“executive” were in constant flux in the 1780s.140  Not only did mem-
bers of the Founding generation disagree on what the Article II ex-
ecutive should look like, but they also disagreed on the meaning of 
the words “executive” and “president,”141 relying on accumulated but 
conflicting experiences under both British rule and state constitu-
tions.142  The meaning of these words could have profound implica-
tions for current debates about the scope of Article II authority, the 
prerogatives of a unitary executive, the President’s removal power,143 
and more.  By attempting to fix the meaning of constitutional terms 
to a date in time—as though the meaning at any given point was stat-
ic—is to misunderstand the revolutionary era’s intellectual motion.  
As Jack Rakove puts it, 
[P]olitical language, like other forms of speech, is necessarily creative, 
and . . . key words develop and acquire new shades of meaning precisely 
because they are subjected to the pressures of active controversy.  The 
adopters of the Constitution inhabited a world that was actively con-
cerned with the nature of language, or more to the point, the instability 
of linguistic meanings, and commentators on the ratification debates 
have observed the extent to which arguments about the definitions of key 
words and concepts were themselves central elements of political de-
bate.144 
Key constitutional terms and ideas were similarly fluid when the 
Reconstruction amendments were drafted and ratified.  As William 
Nelson has argued, the words “equality” and “liberty” were used in 
very different ways in antebellum America.145  The concept of “liber-
ty,” for instance, resonated strongly with abolitionists, slaveholders as-
 
139 See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
160–229 (1967) (recounting transformations in the Founding generation’s conceptions 
of ideas like representation and consent, constitution and rights, and sovereignty); 
RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 94–338 (discussing the evolution of several important constitu-
tional concepts during the revolutionary period); WOOD, supra note 138, at 370–82 (dis-
cussing changes in Americans’ conceptions of “sovereignty” during the Founding peri-
od); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 259 (1991) 
(noting that though the Anti-federalists “lost the battle over the Constitution,” their val-
ues continued to shape popular understandings of American government for decades). 
140 See RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 244–87. 
141 See, e.g., id. at 245 (“Deriving a single definition of executive power could never be a sim-
ple exercise.”). 
142 One problem was that the word “president” sounded common and weak.  Indeed, the 
more muscular state executives were called not “presidents” but “governors.”  See AKHIL 
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 133–35 (2005) (discussing controversy over the 
choice of the word “president” in Article II); see also RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 244–87. 
143 See RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 347–48 (discussing the “removal debate”). 
144 Rakove, supra note 126, at 593. 
145 NELSON, supra note 136, at 13–39. 
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serting their own property rights, and state governments trying to re-
sist federal coercion.146  Similarly, as Nelson argues, Americans in the 
years immediately after the Civil War agreed upon the rightfulness of 
“equality” only because their understandings of the word’s meaning 
differed so dramatically.147  It is no wonder, then, that the words rep-
resenting these contexts were highly under-determinate, as the Four-
teenth Amendment’s ratifiers and framers debated their “vague, 
open-ended, and sometimes clashing” meanings.148  Indeed, these 
words’ very ambiguities probably helped secure the amendment’s rat-
ification.  As Professor Nelson explains, the congressmen and state 
legislators debating the Fourteenth Amendment “continued to make 
fuzzy use of the old antebellum ideas [of liberty and equality], in 
part, perhaps, because the old imprecision . . . enabled them to re-
tain the support of political coalitions whose individual members 
shared an agreement only about vague ideas, not specific pro-
grams.”149 
It may be linguistically defensible to ascribe to all constitutional 
terms a single semantic meaning, but, even putting aside almost inev-
itable evidentiary problems, from a historical standpoint, it is a ca-
nard to assume that all these provisions can be so boiled down, given 
both the contentious debate about the underlying ideas and the fact 
that these concepts were in the process of radical transformations.  
Purporting to freeze the terms at a point in history cannot accurately 
capture one semantic meaning at a given point during a several-
decade transformative process.  Put simply, it ascribes a singular se-
mantic meaning to terms embodying multiple, evolving, and some-
times contradictory ideas. 
In light of these problems, most historians are highly skeptical of 
attempts to freeze history or meaning.150  New originalists would 
counter here that historians are unconcerned with semantic mean-
ing.151  This is usually correct, but it is unclear that this distinction 
undermines the historians’ objections.  A historian like Rakove may 
not write explicitly about semantic meaning, but his basic point—that 
political language evolves during periods of revolutionary change—
 
146 Id. at 21–36. 
147 Id. at 80. 
148 Id. at 63. 
149 Id. at 38–39. 
150 See Eric Foner, The Supreme Court’s Legal History, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 243, 244 (1992) (“To 
freeze history at any single moment, such as the spring of 1866, misses the essence of the 
era, which was continuous and far-reaching change.”). 
151 See Solum, supra note 17, at 112–15 (arguing that many historians do not seek semantic 
meaning). 
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applies to “semantic meaning” as much as it does to history in the 
looser sense.  Because conceptions of the executive were evolving in 
the 1780s, so too were the public meanings of the words “executive” 
and “president” in flux.152 
To some extent, the disagreement between new-originalist legal 
scholars, on the one hand, and historians, on the other, reflects a dis-
agreement about judges’ (and scholars’) ability to locate objective 
truths about our Constitution.  This difference should not be over-
stated.  I concede that some provisions have objective meanings (the 
President must be at least thirty-five), and some new originalists con-
cede that some original public meanings are unknowable.153  The dis-
agreement, then, boils down to the number of instances in which the 
new originalism actually can provide an objective semantic meaning 
that sufficiently constrains judicial choices in actual cases likely to 
arise.  Whereas the new originalists apparently believe that the theory 
will identify some objective original semantic meanings that will bind 
interpreters in real cases, I believe that in most cases that we care 
about, the evidence will not be so clear.  Perhaps in some of those 
cases, the evidence will tend to favor one reading over another, but 
then, semantic originalism would be basing its interpretation on 
probabilities, not certainty.  This is not to say that language does not 
communicate and text has no meaning.  Of course, such an extreme 
position is confused,154 but that is not the objection.  The objections, 
instead, are that sometimes, reasonable hypothetical observers would 
have divided along roughly even lines on the correct meaning of a 
constitutional provision, and oftentimes, the evidence will be too 
complicated for us to know how such observers would have under-
stood the language. 
It is not entirely clear how the new originalist should proceed with 
complicated, inconclusive historical evidence yielding no clearly cor-
rect, objective original semantic meaning.  One possibility would be 
for the judge to take the more likely reading and treat it as the origi-
nal semantic meaning, essentially treating a probably correct reading 
as a definitely correct one.  It would be a legal fiction to assign prob-
abilities to the correctness of semantic meanings based on the rele-
vant evidence, but let us assume that we can.  It seems relatively un-
 
152 See RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 252–53 (noting that 1770s’ state constitutions established 
extremely weak executives but that in the 1780s some states began to revitalize the execu-
tive); supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text. 
153 See Solum, supra note 17, at 37 (conceding that some public historical meanings may be 
unknowable). 
154 See id. at 119–20 (rejecting various semantic skeptics). 
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problematic for the new-originalist judge to treat a reading that is 
ninety-nine-percent likely correct as the original semantic meaning 
and proceed with the constitutional analysis as though such semantic 
meaning has been uncovered and thereby fixed.  By contrast, it is 
more problematic for the judge to do so when she is only fifty-one-
percent sure that she is correct.  The new originalism, by its own 
terms, rests on the primacy of the objective constitutional text,155 so if 
that textual foundation is shaky, it is dangerous to build a legal doc-
trine atop it.  This does not mean that we must require absolute cer-
tainty for the original public meaning to be binding, but a substantial 
degree of uncertainty weakens the textual foundation upon which 
the entire theory rests. 
Of course, other constitutional methodologies do permit judges 
to make decisions based on uncertain judgments; a judge, for in-
stance, may not be certain that she has construed a confusing prece-
dent correctly.  But, typical common-law constitutional decision mak-
ing usually rests on multiple factors, such as precedent, reason, 
structure, past practice, history, text, policy, and more.  This hodge-
podge of factors may render it unpredictable and worthy of criticism, 
but it also means that an incorrect judgment on any single factor will 
not undermine the whole foundation to the same extent.  In other 
words, if common-law constitutional adjudication is like a cable that 
will remain intact if any thread is severed, then the new originalism is 
more like a lone strand of thread.  If the thread is cut, then the whole 
theory fails to work. 
Moreover, the new originalism precariously stakes its legitimacy 
on especially problematic evidence.  For all its flaws, precedent is easy 
to find and limited in scope.  It is also a source with which judges are 
very familiar.  By contrast, the historical evidence needed to identify 
semantic meanings is often difficult to find and even harder to inter-
pret, especially for judges, who usually lack training in historical 
methods.156  It is also less limited, in that one can never be certain that 
one has found all the relevant sources.  Accordingly, we should be 
more confident of judges’ ability to construe precedent “correctly” 
than to construe the kinds of evidence relevant to original public 
meanings.  Of course, this concern may dissipate in those instances 
where the judge is more confident in the correctness of her reading 
 
155 See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 
(2011) (stressing that “the activity of determining semantic meaning at the time of en-
actment . . .  is empirical” and hinges on the “objective social meaning” of the Constitu-
tion’s words). 
156 See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
356 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
of the original public meaning than of the precedent, but given the 
difficulties with the primary sources, those cases would probably be 
relatively infrequent.157  Moreover, given their lack of familiarity with 
the historical evidence, many judges may be prone to misread origi-
nal materials without even realizing it. 
In light of these problems, the new-originalist judge confronting 
contradictory evidence may instead conclude, from any substantial 
degree of uncertainty, that the text is under-determinate (whether 
due to vagueness, ambiguities, gaps, or contradictions) and proceed 
onto step two, constitutional construction.158  Under this approach, 
the judge need not worry about definitively resolving the meanings of 
“executive” in the 1780s or “equality” and “liberty” in the 1860s159 be-
cause the words are still simply under-determinate.160  Because the 
judge turns from interpretation to construction, originalism more or 
less falls out of play,161 and she may turn to other modalities to resolve 
the case, provided that her decision falls within the range of ambigui-
ty created by the alternative plausible semantic meanings.162  The 
problem with this approach is that the new-originalist theory is likely 
doing little work in most cases, except taking the judge through a dif-
ficult, time-consuming investigation only to end up where she started, 
at step one. 
The dispute between the new originalists and their critics partially 
reflects a tension between law professors’ disciplinary allegiances out-
side the law, especially between linguistics and philosophy on the one 
hand, and history on the other.  To someone like Professor Solum, 
who is deeply versed in philosophy and linguistic theory, texts have 
objective, semantic meanings, and constitutional interpreters should 
 
157 See supra notes 107–35 and accompanying text. 
158 See Solum, supra note 17, at 69 (arguing that the role of constitutional construction be-
gins when the inquiry into meaning has been exhausted); cf. Eric Berger, The Collision of 
the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 595 (2006) 
(“[I]t seems not only acceptable but desirable that we should account for the fact that 
one doctrine is more likely correct than the other.”); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 
NW. U. L. REV. 859, 896 (1992) (“Why is it important that courts always be able to give de-
finitive interpretations of the law?”). 
159 See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text. 
160 See NELSON, supra note 136, at 62–63 (noting that Reconstruction debates left the Four-
teenth Amendment’s conflicting meanings to courts to reconcile); RAKOVE, supra note 
60, at 279–87 (noting that ratification debates about the executive speak in generalities 
but “say remarkably little about the specific constitutional arrangements”). 
161 See Solum, supra note 17, at 67–75 (“Constitutional construction begins when the mean-
ing discovered by constitutional interpretation runs out.”); infra Part II.C. 
162 See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1991) (describing 
six different constitutional modalities:  historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical 
and prudential). 
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seek out the original semantic meanings of constitutional provisions.  
Historians, he contends, have different concerns because they are not 
after “semantic meanings.”163  Historians, in return, profess little interest 
“in ascertaining the original meaning of a clause for its own sake, or 
in attempting to freeze or distill its true, unadulterated meaning at 
some pristine moment of constitutional understanding.”164  Rather 
than fixing a single meaning in terms, historians prefer to “revel in—
the ambiguities of the evidentiary record, recognizing that behind 
the textual brevity of any clause there once lay a spectrum of complex 
views and different shadings of opinion.”165 
Solum recognizes that lawyers, philosophers, linguists, and histo-
rians make mistakes when venturing beyond their disciplinary 
boundaries and politely chides historians for not understanding the 
philosophy of language.166  But, in contending that texts have objec-
tive semantic meanings which can yield better constitutional decision 
making, the new originalists sometimes undervalue historians’ re-
peated claims that, oftentimes, the evidentiary problems run too deep 
and the relevant periods are too intellectually unstable for anyone to 
identify a single “correct” constitutional meaning.  Indeed, well-
informed observers during the relevant periods may have resisted the 
notion that key constitutional terms enjoyed fixed meanings.  As 
Rakove points out, James Madison, relying on John Locke, discussed 
the indeterminacy of words and the fallibility of language in The Fed-
eralist Papers.167  While certainly one excerpt from The Federalist Papers 
is determinative of nothing, the Founding generation’s views on lan-
guage and meaning were likely more in line with Locke than Grice.168  
Accordingly, one wonders if the attempt to locate core, singular 
meanings in those same people’s understandings of language, how-
ever philosophically justifiable, may rest on an historical anachronism 
 
163 See Solum, supra note 17, at 115 (“When historians are after the meaning of legal texts, 
they are frequently after something quite different; they are searching for the purpose or 
reasons for which the text was written.  Such purposes are not semantic meanings.”). 
164 RAKOVE, supra note 60, at 9. 
165 Id. at 9–10. 
166 See Solum, supra note 17, at 115 (“[F]ew historians . . . have basic competency in the phi-
losophy of language . . . .”). 
167 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 225 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[N]o 
language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so cor-
rect as not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas.  Hence it must happen 
that . . . the definition of [words] may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the 
terms in which it is delivered.”); see also Rakove, supra note 126, at 594 (discussing Locke’s 
influence on Madison’s views on language). 
168 See Rakove, supra note 126, at 588 n.33, 600 (arguing that Locke’s philosophy on lan-
guage influenced Madison’s perspective on language). 
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that compromises the very enterprise.  The new originalists might 
counter that the meaning of “meaning” does not hinge on how dif-
ferent cultures perceive “meaning,”169 but if the Founding genera-
tion’s use and understanding of words included an implicit recogni-
tion of those words’ indeterminacy, that understanding would add yet 
another layer of complexity and indeterminacy to an already compli-
cated historical record. 
Relatedly, the new originalists underestimate the extent to which 
constitution-making sometimes renders language more unstable than 
it would be in more ordinary circumstances.  Even the most ardent 
originalists seem to recognize that the Constitution was itself a rough 
political compromise whose meanings were deeply contested.170  Nev-
ertheless, many still cling to the view that the language brokering this 
rough compromise should strictly bind judges.  Many members of the 
Founding generation, however, understood the Constitution's text 
differently, insisting that its meanings would need to be “liquidated” 
over the generations through “discussions and adjudications.”171  Sim-
ilarly, national leaders during Reconstruction likened the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s language to “a sign on a highway with different inscrip-
tions on each side, so that people approaching the sign from oppo-
site directions necessarily read it differently.”172  This is not to say that 
judges should never take constitutional text seriously, but, ironically,  
the new originalists’ supreme elevation of the constitutional text over 
all other interpretive factors may misunderstand the way the Found-
ing and Reconstruction generations thought about constitutional 
language.173 
Indeed, as Professor Nelson argues, the people who framed the 
Fourteenth Amendment “were acting primarily as statesmen and po-
 
169 See Solum, supra note 17, at 115 (distinguishing “semantic meaning” from other sorts of 
“meaning”). 
170 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 66, at 861 (“[T]he Constitution . . . was a political compromise 
that did not pretend to create a perfect society . . . .”). 
171 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 167, at 225 (discussing the Constitution as “more 
or less obscure and equivocal, until [its] meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a se-
ries of particular discussions and adjudications” (emphasis omitted)); see also Mark R. 
Killenbeck, Madison, M’Culloch, and Matters of Judicial Cognizance:  Some Thoughts on the 
Nature and Scope of Judicial Review, 55 ARK. L. REV. 901, 914 (2003) (arguing that many of 
the influential members of the Founding generation believed that the interpretation and 
implementation of the Constitution “was ongoing and contextual”). 
172 NELSON, supra note 136, at 143 (citing Charles Sumner’s views of the Amendment). 
173 See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 136, at 8 (“Those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not design it to provide judges with a determinative text for resolving . . . conflict[s] 
in a narrow doctrinal fashion.”). 
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litical leaders, not as legal draftsmen.”174  Their contemporaries, then, 
likely understood the words not to offer legal guidance, but rather 
political compromise, through the acceptance of extremely broad 
principles.  The new originalists might respond that words have se-
mantic content regardless of the speakers’ intentions.  Accepting ar-
guendo this theory of language, we must still wrestle with the distinct 
possibility that the reasonably informed citizen would have under-
stood that the Fourteenth Amendment’s words would mean different 
things to different people.  On this view, the original public meaning 
of many key phrases may have been under-determinate, even at the 
time.  Perhaps in a different context, these same words might have 
communicated something more precise, but in the context of consti-
tution-making following the Civil War, they did not.  Phrased some-
what differently, if the reasonable observer in 1868 would have un-
derstood Section 1’s capacious language to offer not legal guidance 
but a largely undefined political compromise, then attempts to inter-
pret those words to mean something more precise may actually per-
vert the clause’s original public meaning.  To be sure, the new-
originalist judge in this instance could conclude that the text is un-
der-determinate and, therefore, turn to constitutional construction, 
but given that much constitutional language from 1787 and 1868 
embodied such rough political compromises, originalism under this 
approach would not do much work. 
Of course, even where the original public meaning is arguably 
more determinate, there still remains the serious problem of figuring 
out what the words mean.  As Gordon S. Wood has written, “It may be 
a necessary fiction for lawyers and jurists to believe in a ‘correct’ or 
‘true’ interpretation of the Constitution in order to carry on their 
business, but we historians have different obligations and aims,” such 
as identifying the Constitution’s contrasting meanings.175  Perhaps 
most historians (and, for that matter, law professors) do not under-
stand the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Grice,176 but any account of 
constitutional meaning must rely upon historical evidence.  If judges 
do not sufficiently appreciate the nuances within the relevant texts 
and the broader intellectual climate surrounding those texts, then 
their account is likely to be tainted, no matter how sophisticated their 
 
174 Id. at 143. 
175 Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 628, 632–33 
(1987). 
176 See Solum, supra note 17, at 112–15 (examining a canonical history article that analyzes 
Wittgensteinian and Gricean philosophies). 
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philosophical theory.  Fixation, in short, rests upon an objectivity that 
is more often mythical than real. 
C.  Constraint Problems 
The conclusion that it will often be difficult or impossible to ascer-
tain the original semantic meaning is an indication that the new 
originalism’s capacity to constrain is also limited.  Of course, there 
are some provisions for which the original public meaning is clear 
and precise.177  In such cases, this meaning will often presumptively 
govern and, thus, constrain.  But, these kinds of clauses are rarely the 
provisions subject to litigation, so it is not clear that the new 
originalism would constrain very much in actual cases.  It is true, of 
course, that the original public meaning of the term “domestic vio-
lence” in Article IV, Section 4 referred to riots and insurrections, ra-
ther than spousal abuse, and the new originalism intelligently re-
minds us that it is the original, rather than the contemporary, 
meaning of the words that must govern.178  But, no informed observer 
would interpret the Domestic Violence Clause to apply to spousal 
abuse, so it is unclear that the new originalism actually adds con-
straints that did not already exist.179  Instead, litigation that actually 
turns on a provision’s original public meaning is more likely to in-
volve provisions like the Second Amendment, about whose original 
semantic meaning reasonable people can and do differ.180 
To their credit, many new originalists recognize that constitution-
al text cannot decide all cases.181  Indeed, it is precisely those cases in 
which the constitutional text is under-determinate that judges must 
turn from interpretation to construction.182  In such instances, after 
interpreting the text to find an under-determinate original semantic 
 
177 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
178 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 
101 (2010) (discussing the phrase “domestic violence” in the Constitution). 
179 See Colby, supra note 7, at 753 (arguing that new originalists’ constraint arguments do not 
have any substance). 
180 See supra notes 30–49 and accompanying text; cf. Solum, supra note 59, at 143, 145 (argu-
ing that the fact that constitutional litigation involves issues in construction should not 
obscure the fact that the constitutional text provides guidance in many cases that are nev-
er litigated). 
181 See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69 
(2011) (“The text of the Constitution may say a lot, but it does not say everything one 
needs to know to resolve all possible cases and controversies.”); supra note 100 and ac-
companying text. 
182 See Solum, supra note 17, at 69 (“It must be the case that meaning does run out before 
providing sufficient content to determine the outcome of issues faced in constitutional 
practice.”). 
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meaning, the judge’s constitutional construction “must be guided by 
something other than original meaning,”183 so that “other forms of 
constitutional argumentation may be given relatively free rein.”184  As 
Professor Barnett explains, “Unless there is something in the text that 
favors one construction over the other, it is not originalism that is do-
ing the work when one selects a theory of construction to employ 
when original meaning runs out, but one’s underlying normative 
commitments.”185 
This candid assessment concedes that at the construction stage, 
the new originalism does not constrain judicial choices, except inso-
far as the constitutional construction must not violate the text.186  
Nevertheless, curiously, some originalists still maintain that this new 
originalism does constrain in important ways.187  Judge Douglas Gins-
burg goes so far as to argue that new originalism is more constraining 
than earlier variants because it is “more objective.”188  Given that some 
of semantic originalism’s most prominent advocates have explained 
that judges may consult the full panoply of interpretive methodolo-
gies during the “construction” phase,189 it seems doubtful that at least 
these iterations of the new originalism significantly constrain judicial 
decision making.190  Nevertheless, as Judge Ginsburg’s comment indi-
cates, the myth of constraint persists. 
 
183 Solum, supra note 16, at 934. 
184 Whittington, supra note 1, at 82. 
185 Barnett, supra note 181, at 70. 
186 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 645 (1999) 
(arguing that constitutional interpretation must be distinguished from constitutional 
construction, the latter of which should be used when meaning is under-determinate); 
Solum, supra note 19, at 495 (arguing that “[c]onstruction is ubiquitous”). 
187 See, e.g., Colby, supra note 7, at 750 (arguing that most new originalists still promise that 
their methodology will constrain judicial decision making); Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004) (arguing that the new originalism 
“requires judges to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing 
less”). 
188 Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis:  Two Case Studies of Consistency and 
Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 237 (2010). 
189 See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text. 
190 Admittedly, some new originalists offer variations that constrain judges more.  For exam-
ple, Gary Lawson contends that originalists can avoid constitutional construction by 
adopting constitutional default rules, which would apply when the text’s meaning is un-
certain.  See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1234 (2012) (“In 
the event that there is any uncertainty about what this Constitution means in any specific 
application, resolve the uncertainty against the existence of federal power and in favor of 
the existence of state power.”); see also Solum, supra note 19, at 512–14 (discussing Law-
son’s argument that constitutional interpretation can eliminate the need for constitu-
tional construction by creating default rules).  This approach would limit judicial discre-
tion insofar as it would provide judges with instructions for resolving cases when 
constitutional meaning runs out.  At least one other scholar makes a related point.  See 
 
362 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
Of course, this is not to argue that the new originalism does not 
constrain at all.  The new originalism does forbid constitutional con-
structions from violating the original semantic meaning of the consti-
tutional provision in question.191  However, in emphasizing constraint 
as one of originalism’s selling points,192 originalists are implying that 
their methodology constrains more successfully than alternative 
methodologies.  This implication is dubious.  A judge who has already 
found that the relevant provision is under-determinate enough to 
trigger a move from interpretation to construction is unlikely to find 
that same provision very constraining at the construction stage. 
In reality, the new originalism, at the construction stage, is similar 
to the status quo in constitutional interpretation, in that the judge is 
given wide leeway.  For instance, a judge could, consistent with new 
originalism, decide that when the text’s semantic meaning runs out, 
she will defer to the legislature or, alternatively, adopt a presumption 
of liberty.193  These approaches would be consistent with many vari-
ants of the new originalism but would yield opposite results in most 
cases.  To this extent, constitutional construction is potentially even 
less constraining than common law constitutional interpretation 
seeking to follow precedent, which most Justices do anyway.194 
 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 857, 878 (2009) (disputing that when the text is indeterminate, “an inter-
preter therefore has interpretive license to fill the gaps with whatever content the inter-
preter desires”).  However, many other versions of new originalism do not build in such 
constraining canons of construction.  See BALKIN, supra note 5, at 3; Barnett, supra note 
181, at 70; Solum, supra note 17, at 18–19.   
   In all events, the variety of new originalism theories creates a similar problem of mal-
leability that was characteristic of the old originalism.  See supra Part I.A.  While this varie-
ty reflects the richness of the scholarly landscape, it also belies the notion that a universal 
turn to this method of interpretation will place all judges on the same page.  Of course, 
this objection does not undermine the constraining capacity of any particular variant of 
new originalism.  Nevertheless, if constitutional theory is to constrain judges, it must get 
them to agree on common ground, and the absence of such common ground, even 
among self-described new originalists, suggests that it will be hard to agree on a universal 
approach.  In some instances, these theoretical differences may not yield significant prac-
tical differences, but in some instances, they certainly would.  See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 
181, at 70; infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
191 See Solum, supra note 5, at 154 (noting that originalists believe that “original meaning 
should have binding or constraining force”). 
192 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
193 See Barnett, supra note 181, at 70 (“So, just as originalists need a normative theory to ex-
plain why we today should adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution, they also 
need a normative theory for how to construe a constitution when its meaning runs out.”).  
But see Lawson, supra note 190, at 1234 (adopting such a presumption against the consti-
tutionality of federal legislation). 
194 See STRAUSS, supra note 77, at 44 (“The common law approach is what we actually do.”). 
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Indeed, far from constraining judges, a turn to new originalism 
could liberate judges from the shackles of current constitutional doc-
trine.  Because the Constitution is short and vague, its text has been 
less presumptively decisive than more prolix statutes.195  Constitution-
al text, in other words, has generally taken a back seat in constitu-
tional interpretation through the generations.196  Accordingly, a shift 
to the new originalism, away from common-law interpretive practices, 
would yield great legal uncertainty, as it would reopen long-accepted 
precedents for reexamination on the grounds that those precedents 
are inconsistent with original public meaning.197  For example, we 
have a complex body of free speech doctrine permitting certain 
abridgements of expression, including, among others, incitements to 
violence, fighting words, and child pornography.198  However, as not-
ed above, the First Amendment’s language speaks in absolutes, stipu-
lating that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”199  Some prominent thinkers, including Justice Hugo Black, 
have insisted that the First Amendment’s “emphatic command” for-
bids any abridgement of speech,200 but a move in that direction today 
would unsettle decades of precedent.201  (Such textual devotion would 
also need to justify First Amendment prohibitions on executive 
abridgements of speech, given that the text is directed solely at “Con-
 
195 See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget, 
that it is a constitution we are expounding.”); STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 34–35 (explaining 
that in our system, constitutional precedent representing “two centuries of experience 
grappling with the fundamental issues” typically takes precedence over the Constitution’s 
short text). 
196 See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 
1717, 1726 (2003) (“[Constitutional] text plays essentially no operative role in deciding 
the most controversial constitutional questions (about discrimination, fundamental 
rights, and freedom of expression, for example) . . . .”).  In addition to the new 
originalists, Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz has also recently emphasized the importance 
of the Constitution’s text.  See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Con-
stitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Con-
stitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010). 
197 See Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 78, 115 (exploring challenges of overturn-
ing precedent that does not conform with originalist interpretation). 
198 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 776 (1982) (“This special and compelling in-
terest, and the particular vulnerability of children, afford the State the leeway to regulate 
pornographic material, the promotion of which is harmful to children . . . .”); Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (allowing for abridgements of speech that  in-
cite “imminent lawless action”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 
(1942) (discussing classes of speech that can be restricted without offending First 
Amendment speech rights). 
199 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
200 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). 
201 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
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gress.”)  Similarly, the complex body of Eleventh Amendment doc-
trine would be, at a minimum, revisited were the Court to adopt the 
new originalism as its sole method of constitutional interpretation.202  
And, even decades of incorporation doctrine, under which most of 
the Bill of Rights is applied against the states, would also be revisited, 
as it is hardly clear that the original public meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment disrupted the settled practice of applying those 
rights only against the federal government.203  From this perspective, 
the adoption of a constitutional methodology that reopens many 
seemingly decided issues could hardly be less constraining.204  If any-
thing, because originalism, unlike some other constitutional meth-
odologies, purports to lock in constitutional meaning forever, the 
new originalism may invite justices to aggrandize their own power by 
selecting a single (contestable) original meaning to displace settled 
law and serve as binding precedent in all future cases. 
Constitutional theories’ capacity to constrain, in short, cannot be 
judged solely in a vacuum but must be weighed in light of the culture 
of interpretation already accumulated.  Of course, as Professor Solum 
argues, originalists need not be committed to “irrational absolutism” 
and could follow even non-originalist precedent if it would be too 
disruptive not to do so.205  This is an important and sensible conces-
sion rendering the new originalism more palatable in practice.  How-
ever, given how much constitutional precedent is not originalist,206 
this concession also risks gutting the theory, except in rare cases in 
which there is little relevant precedent, such as (arguably) Heller.207 
Given the great flexibility deliberately built into constitutional 
construction, the only way in which the new originalism can mean-
ingfully constrain judges is at the interpretation stage—that is, by ar-
guing that constitutional text is determinate enough to settle many a 
 
202 See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
203 See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?  The 
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 139 (1949) (“In his contention that Section I was 
intended and understood to impose Amendments I to VIII upon the states, the record of 
history is overwhelmingly against [Justice Black].”); Lawrence Rosenthal, The New 
Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment:  Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incor-
poration, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361, 365 (2009) (“Viewed through the lens of orig-
inal public meaning, the historical case for incorporation is therefore problematic.”). 
204 See Rakove, supra note 126, at 578 (noting that public meaning originalism “can be enor-
mously liberating . . . because it allows courts to ignore well-grounded precedent in the 
pursuit of a vision of original constitutional meaning”).  
205 See Solum, supra note 59, at 143, 158–59. 
206 See STRAUSS, supra note 77, at 34–35. 
207 But see Solum, supra note 59, at 143, 159 (discussing the virtues of a “slow and steady ad-
vance” of originalist jurisprudence). 
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case.208  But, that argument takes us full circle, back to the problem of 
fixation and the reality that the constitutional provisions most likely 
to end up in litigation are those that lack discernible, determinate 
meaning.209  Indeed, even determining which sources count as suffi-
ciently contemporaneous to inform the “original semantic meaning” 
is a difficult judgment call that offers judges great latitude.  (Is ten 
years before or after ratification sufficiently contemporaneous?  
Twenty?)  At best, these inquiries may point to a range of possible 
meanings or eliminate some potential interpretations.210  At the end 
of the day, then, the new originalism, just like the old, fails to con-
strain judicial decision making any better than other methods of con-
stitutional interpretation.211 
CONCLUSION 
The historian Rakove once observed that law professors and judg-
es think like foxes rather than hedgehogs in that they dabble in his-
tory (and other disciplines) and then move on.212  Rakove, of course, 
was referencing Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction between two types 
of intellectuals:  the hedgehog, who knows one thing, and the fox, 
who knows many.213  As Berlin put it,  
there exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate every-
thing to a single central vision, one system less or more coherent and ar-
ticulate . . . and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often 
 
208 See Colby, supra note 7, at 773 (“[S]ome originalists seek to avoid the consequences of the 
New Originalism by insisting that the objective, original public meaning of the Constitu-
tion’s major rights clauses is much less abstract.”). 
209 See supra Part II.B. 
210 See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 
1093,  1093 n.729 (1995) (noting that a particular argument is interpretation “within the 
legitimate range of interpretations of the Amendment on originalist grounds”); H. Jeffer-
son Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 690 (1987) (“History sometimes re-
veals a range of ‘original understandings.’”). 
211 See Tushnet, supra note 43, at 617 (“The new originalism, like the old, fails to deliver on 
its claim about eliminating judicial subjectivity, judgment, and choice.”).  Interestingly, 
other countries seeking to constrain judges usually reject American-style originalism as a 
viable option.  See generally Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
2–4 (2009). 
212 See Jack N. Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191, 213 (1999) 
(reviewing 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) and AKHIL 
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998)) (discussing 
Berlin’s metaphor of the hedgehog and the fox). 
213 See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX 1 (1966) (building on Archilochus’s ob-
servation). 
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unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de fac-
to way.214   
Rakove’s point was that lawyers are fox-like in their capacity to hunt 
for helpful theories and evidence, in their adventurous forays outside 
their own disciplinary boundaries, and in their propensity, over the 
course of their careers, to make an argument in one case entirely 
contrary to an argument in another. 
With due respect to Rakove, I would submit that we can also think 
of many judges, lawyers, and even law professors as hedgehogs, rather 
than foxes—and, for reasons Rakove might find convincing.  Judges 
and lawyers are, by training, advocates, and they are highly skilled at 
marshaling evidence zealously in favor of a certain outcome.215  In this 
regard, the advocate and advocate-turned judge (or law professor) 
sometimes proceeds like a hedgehog, viewing evidence through a 
single-minded lens to build a convincing case.216  All evidence bolsters 
the central argument, whether presented in a lawyer’s brief, a judge’s 
opinion, or a professor’s scholarly agenda. 
In fairness, most judges do not have much choice.  It may be true, 
as the Reconstruction historian Eric Foner has written, that most his-
torians would not say that there is a single, universally accepted origi-
nal meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment (or many other constitu-
tional provisions),217 but the judge often does not have the luxury of 
 
214 Id. 
215 See Timothy P. O’Neill, Law and “The Argumentative Theory,” 90 OR. L. REV. 837, 848 (2012) 
(“When a judicial opinion—especially a U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion in a five-to-
four case—is couched in completely unequivocal language, its message to the other side 
is:  ‘You’re wrong.  And, by the way, you are stupid and perhaps dishonest, too.’”); Laura 
E. Little, Hiding with Words:  Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 75, 85 (1998) (“Repeated exposure to adversaries’ arguments, set up as 
opposing poles, establish a habit of mind for judges who in turn write opinions as though 
they present a preordained correct answer, which embraces by necessity only one position 
or viewpoint.”). 
216 Although there are great advantages in having accomplished lawyers ascend to the bench, 
it is worth noting that some countries have lay judges or professional judges who have 
never practiced as lawyers.  See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE 
CIVIL LAW TRADITION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN 
AMERICA 103–04 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that in some countries, high court judges will have 
served their entire careers as judges and, never having practiced, “will see the law solely 
from the judge’s point of view”); John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication 
and Human Rights in Europe, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83, 93–100 (2006) (discussing lay judg-
es).  Whatever their disadvantages, these judges may not be as prone to some lawyers’ 
professional biases.  See Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
1569, 1586–91 (2007) (arguing that lawyers are prone to distinctive professional biases). 
217 See Eric Foner, The Original Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment:  A Conversation with Eric 
Foner, 6 NEV. L.J. 425, 427 (2006) (“I don’t think any historian would say there was a sin-
gle meaning that was universally accepted in the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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concluding that the law is unclear.  To the extent that judges must 
decide a constitutional case one way or another (at least when they 
do not dispose of it on other grounds), they gain little from illustrat-
ing the maddening historical and linguistic complexities of a ques-
tion. 
Most judges, I believe, honestly and earnestly try to reach the 
“right” outcome,218 but originalism often makes it harder, not easier, 
for them to do so.  If applied consistently, as a sole method of consti-
tutional interpretation today, originalism of any stripe would reopen 
countless areas of constitutional doctrine, creating great uncertainty 
in the law.  It, moreover, would force judges to place great weight on 
a complex body of obscure evidence with which they have minimal 
training, thus heightening the danger that the judge will make hon-
est mistakes or take interpretive liberties.  By contrast, the traditional 
common-law approach to constitutional interpretation, for all its 
flaws, presents judges with a generally accepted common ground and 
a limited range of plausible answers.219 
Moreover, the historical evidence often does not clearly indicate a 
correct semantic meaning, so it is misleading for judges to pretend 
otherwise.  Indeed, judicial opinions as a genre are not good vehicles 
for careful historical or historically based linguistic analyses.  This is 
not just because judges lack the training to do history well (although 
that is true),220 but also because judges’ and historians’ temperaments 
and objectives differ.  Whereas the historian can spend years re-
searching a nuanced book that acknowledges the contradictions of 
an era, the judge must justify, in less time and fewer words, why her 
resolution of a case is “correct.”  Historians can account for paradox 
and tension; lawyers and judges must justify outcomes.221  This is not 
to say that historians are more fair-minded than lawyers or judges; 
 
218 Cf. Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 IOWA 
L. REV. 465, 530–32 (2013) (noting that there are many talented, earnest judges who 
work to resolve constitutional issues in accordance with constitutional principles). 
219 See Strauss, supra note 196, at 1729–31 (discussing the merits of the common law ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation). 
220 See Matthew J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past:  The Use of History in Law, 38 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 479, 526 (2008) (“[J]udges are not trained in the methods of professional histori-
ans.”); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1588 
(1997) (“[T]here is good historical evidence that jurists rarely make good histori-
ans . . . .”). 
221 See Jack N. Rakove, Confessions of an Ambivalent Originalist, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1346, 1347 
(2003) (“Unlike lawyers, we [historians] are not trained to speak with the voice of the ad-
vocate or the adversary. . . . The nuance, subtlety, and respect for ambiguity that we [his-
torians] cherish and relish in our research cannot easily be translated into urgent politi-
cal discussion.”). 
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historians, too, build arguments shaped by their own biases.222  The 
difference, however, is that the historians’ end-product can—and 
should—admit, and even highlight, paradox, whereas the judge’s 
opinion must defend her holding against contrary views. 
In fairness, judges applying other constitutional methodologies 
can also find evidence and build arguments to justify a preferred out-
come.223  This is especially so in close cases where reasonable people 
can disagree and where even the most fair-minded person may find it 
difficult to eliminate normative bias from legal analysis.224  
Originalism, then, is hardly the only methodology that fails to con-
strain judicial decision making.  Originalism is particularly worthy of 
criticism, however, because of its pretense that it is different—that it 
captures the Constitution’s singular meaning and that it uniquely 
“fixes” that “correct” meaning and, thereby, constrains judges’ choic-
es.  In this regard, originalism creates an especially misleading illu-
sion of certainty.  It may be comforting to think that clear, original 
meanings constrain judicial decision making, but in most real cases, 
this is a false comfort.  As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed, 
“[C]ertainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of 
man.”225 
 
222 See CROSS, supra note 25, at 109 (citing various historians). 
223 See Harrison, supra note 89, at 481 (“[Judges] will formulate the goal of the Fourteenth 
Amendment differently, and come to different conclusions about the effects of legal 
rules, or both.”). 
224 See Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 818 (2013) (“However impartial they try to be, judges, as 
human beings, cannot wholly divorce their own values from their rulings, especially in 
close cases about which reasonable people can differ on the correct legal outcome.”); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 321, 324, 34553 (1990) (arguing that judges cannot convincingly exclude 
current values from their interpretations and that decisions often involve conformity to 
contemporary circumstances and values). 
225 Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, Address at the dedication of a new hall at the 
Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897). 
